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SECTION 16(b) AND CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEFINITION OF "CLASS"
When Thomas Corcoran told the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency that section 16 of what was to become the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934' was a "crude rule of thumb," 2 he not only
made legislative history that has become trite through repetition, but
also set the stage for a battle over just how crude section 16 should
really be. The battle, which has centered on the definitions of "pur-
chase" and "sale" as used in section 16(b),' is far from over, but the
start of a new skirmish may have been signalled by the Second Circuit's
opinion in Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp.4 where the court
sought to give meaning to section 16's phrase "class of any equity
security" when convertible debentures are the "equity security"
involved.
One of the few undisputed statements that can be made about
section 16 is that it was intended to prevent profit-taking on advance
information not generally available to the public. Prevention of
insider trading was accomplished primarily through two subsections.
Subsection (a) ,' the disclosure provision of section 16, requires insiders
to file a statement of ownership of securities with the Securities Ex-
change Commission. Those subject to the filing requirement are
identified as directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more than ten
per cent of any class of equity security. The inclusion of the ordinary
investor among those considered insiders is justified on the theory that
an owner of as much as ten per cent of any class "is as much an insider
as an officer or director" and "normally is, as a practical matter of
fact, a director." 6 Subsection (b) , 7 the purging provision, makes these
insiders liable to the corporation for profits realized from transactions
involving a purchase and sale (or sale and purchase) of any equity
security of the issuer within a six-month period. Thus, the basic logic
of section 16 seems clear: since the purpose is to prevent misuse of
115 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
2 Hearings on S. Res. 84, 56, and 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6557 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
3 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964) ; see, e.g.,
Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967) ; Blau
v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965);
Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959) ;
Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761
(1947). -
4 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
G Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
6 Hearings 6556.
Ir Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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inside information, those most likely to have access to such information,
either from participation in corporate policy-making or administration
or from influence with such participants, should be the ones subject to
regulation.'
With respect to holders of convertible securities,' however, the
apparent simplicity of section 16 is misleading. The difficulty lies in
deciding on the relevant "class" for the purpose of determining whether
the owner is a ten per cent holder and therefore subject to the trading
restrictions. There are three possibilities: (1) the relevant "class"
could be the class of convertible securities, so that percentage ownership
is calculated on the basis of only the convertibles outstanding; (2) the
"class" could be defined to include all outstanding securities of the
class for which the convertible is exchangeable; "o or (3) "class" could
be taken to refer to both the class of convertibles and the class of
underlying security, so that a holder of convertibles would be a
section 16 insider if he held, or would hold after conversion, ten
per cent of either class.
The phrase "class of any equity security" had received little
judicial interpretation prior to the Chemical Fund decision. Rule
16a-2, before a recent amendment," had merely indicated that the
percentage ownership of a class was to be determined on the basis
of the "total amount of such class outstanding," 12 exclusive of any
securities of the class held by or for the account of the issuer. Ap-
parently, it was assumed that convertibles were a class separate from
the underlying security.
The only case construing "class" before Chemical Fund was
Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.,'3 decided eight
years earlier. There, the Second Circuit had faced the question
whether a "series" of preferred stock constituted a "class" for the
purposes of section 16. Finding no prior case law, no specific
statutory definition, and no legislative history on the issue, the court
concluded that "class" was to be understood in the "ordinary and
generally accepted sense according to the common usage of the day
8 See Hearings 7441-43.
9 The convertible security, generally speaking, is a bond [or debenture] or
preferred stock which at the option of the holder is exchangeable under
specified terms and conditions for the common shares of the same corporation.
C. PILCHER, RAISING CAPITAL WITH CONVmrB SECURITIS 2 (1955).
10 ln order to determine percentage ownership, the number of shares of the under-
lying security outstanding would be added to the number of shares into which the
owner of the convertibles could convert. This figure would then be divided into the
number of shares into which the convertible owner could convert plus the number
of shares of the underlying security held by such owner.
3" See text accompanying note 32 infra.
12 17 C.F.R § 240.16a-2 (1964).
13 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959).
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[1934] in the legal and financial worlds." "4 Applying this test, the
court held that a series could not be considered a class for the purposes
of section 16 since, in common usage, "class" and "series" were usually
differentiated, a "series" being considered a part of a "class." The
SEC had submitted an amicus curiae brief arguing that each series
involved was a "class," ', but after the adverse decision it made no
further attempt at definition through its rule-making power.1"
Judicial determination of the "class" appropriate for convertible
securities was first required in the Chemical Fund case. The Second
Circuit was confronted with the question whether Chemical Fund, the
owner of more than ten per cent of the outstanding convertible deben-
tures of Xerox Corporation, was the owner of ten per cent of a "class
of any equity security" and thus liable for short-swing profits under
section 16(b), even though it would hold less than ten per cent of the
Xerox common stock if it converted its debentures. Under the
Ellerin rule that "class" should be construed according to its "common
usage," and under section 3(a) (11) of the Act," which includes in
the definition of "equity security" any security convertible into an
equity security, it would seem clear that debentures convertible into
common stock are a "class of equity security" within the meaning
of the Act, and the district court so held.'" The court of appeals,
however, while conceding that convertible debentures are "equity
securities," held that they do not constitute a "class of equity security"
for the purposes of determining percentage ownership and liability
under section 16(b). 9
The court was distressed by the "anomaly" that would have
resulted from holding Chemical Fund liable: a potential owner of less
than three per cent of the common stock would be accountable for
short-swing profits while an actual owner of 9.99 per cent of the
common would be immune from such liability.
2 0
The court also felt that section 16 was intended to apply only to
"stockholders" and that holders of "debentures as such" were not in-
14 Id. at 262. The court stated:
But the very absence of congressional direction or guidance suggests that
Congress thought the meaning of the phrase . . . was reasonably clear and it
was using familiar terms ....
15 See id. at 261.
16See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 3(b), 23(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c (b),
78w(a) (1964). Pursuant to §3(b) of the Act, the SEC did, however, issue
rule 3b-2, 17 C.F.R. §240.3b-2 (1964), defining "officer" to mean "a president,
vice-president, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person who performs
for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to
those performed by the foregoing officers."
17 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (11) (1964).
18 [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCII FED. SEC. L. REP. 1191,653 (W.D.N.Y.
1966).
19 377 F.2d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1967).
20 Of course, such an anomaly is inherent in the congressional scheme, which is
based on class ownership. Those who own 10% of small classes will be subject to § 16,
while those who own 9% of larger classes-and who may have a far greater invest-
ment in the company-will not face such liabilities.
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cluded within its scope. 2' The court based its conclusion on its findings
that (1) nowhere in the hearings preceding passage of the Act was
there any indication that debenture holders as such were to be in-
cluded; and (2) bondholders, originally included within section 16(a),
were excluded from the final draft.' This exclusion, the court noted,
was "apparently" due to protests such as those contained in a letter
from the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks stating that
"[b]ondholders as such exercise no control over the management of
the issuer and its policies." 23 Equating corporate control with voting
power, the court reasoned that "stockholders owning more than 10
percent of the voting stock of the company, if not in control, would be
closely advised, as their votes usually elected the directors who in turn
elected the officers, where these were not elected directly by the
stockholders." 24 The court concluded that convertible debentures are
considered "equity securities" solely because of the power to convert
into common, and the determination of percentage ownership should
therefore be calculated on the percentage of the common the owner
would hold following conversion. 5
A more careful analysis of the legislative history, however, shows
that it is in fact inconclusive on the issue whether convertible deben-
tures should be considered a separate "class of equity security." The
fact that debentures were not mentioned in the hearings is as indicative
of inclusion as it is of exclusion. The letter from the National
Association of Mutual Savings Banks was neither discussed nor re-
ferred to in the hearings, but was merely appended with several other
letters discussing various aspects of the bill. Aside from the revision
itself, that letter appears to be the sole evidence of any concern over
the distinction between stocks and bonds. The revision of the bill
may or may not have been for the reasons stated in the letter; the
Senate Report substituting the revision for the original bill does not
deal with the question.2"
Contrary to the inference drawn by the court, the revision can be
read to have expanded coverage under section 16(b) to include holders
of convertible debentures. The original bill distinguished between
subsections (a) and (b) by using the term "securities" in (a) (which
section 3 defined to include bonds and debentures) while using the
term "stock" in (b), implying the exclusion of bonds and debentures.
2 7
21377 F.2d at 110.
2 21d.
23 Id. at 110 n. 4.
2 4 1d. at 110-11.
25Id.
26 See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
27See S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 78 COxG. REc. 2265, 2268
(1934):
§ 15(a) Every director, officer, or owner of securities, owning as of record
and/or beneficially more than 5 per cent of any class of securities of any
1969]
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In the revised bill, the term "equity security" was substituted in both
sections, 28 and this term was defined to include any security convertible
into a stock. Thus, while convertible debentures would not have been
included in section (b) of the original draft, they were expressly in-
cluded in the final draft. While the revision had the effect of narrowing
the scope of subsection (a) from "securities" to "equity securities"
(thereby excluding nonconvertible bonds and debentures), it also ex-
panded the scope of subsection (b) by substituting "equity securities"
(defined to include convertible debentures and bonds) for "stock."
RuLE 16a-2
In its amicus brief in Chemical Fund the SEC argued that
convertible debentures should be considered a separate class under the
Ellerin rationale since they "are not considered to come within the
same class as common stock in the 'ordinary and generally accepted
sense.' "29 The court summarily rejected this argument on the ground
that while in Ellerin the court had no statutory history to guide it, in
this case the "purpose of section 16(b) to impose liability on the
basis of actual or potential control is clear and we should give it
effect." 30
The court's opinion did not, however, deter the SEC from amend-
ing rule 16a-2 " to explain specifically in which class the owner of
convertible securities belongs for the purpose of computing percentage
ownership under section 16(a). The amendment added the following
paragraph to the existing rule:
In determining for the purpose of Section 16(a) of the Act
whether a person is the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly,
of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities, such
person shall be deemed to be the beneficial owner of securities
of such class which such person has the right to acquire
. . . through the conversion of presently convertible secu-
rities. The securities subject to such . . . conversion
privileges held by a person shall be deemed to be outstanding
for the purpose of computing, in accordance with paragraph
issuer . . . shall file .... (Emphasis added.)
§ 15(b) It shall be unlawful for any director, officer, or owner of securities,
owning as of record and/or beneficially more than 5 percent of any class of
stock of any issuer . . . . (Emphasis added.)
§3(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest.
2See S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
2 9 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 7, Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967).
80 377 F.2d at 111.
3133 Fed. Reg. 8774, amending 17 C.F.R. § 240.16 a-2 (1964).
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(a), the percentage of outstanding securities of the class
owned by such person but shall not be deemed outstanding
for the purpose of computing the percentage of the class
owned by any other person. This paragraph shall not be
construed to relieve any person of any duty to comply with
Section 16(a) of the Act with respect to any equity secu-
rities consisting of . . . convertible securities which are
otherwise subject as a class to that section. 2
At first glance it appears that the Commission merely adopted
the holding of Chemical Fund in providing that holders of convertibles
are deemed owners of the class they have a privilege to acquire by
conversion. However, the amendment differs from the court's holding
in two respects: (1) it is specifically limited to the "purposes of
Section 16(a)," and (2) it indicates that the owner of convertibles
is to be considered the owner of securities within the classes of both
the underlying stock and the convertibles themselves. These differences
are apparent from the SEC's releases. In the release proposing the
amendment, the Commission stated:
Under the present Rule 16a-2 the Commission has taken the
position that ownership reports are required for persons
owning in excess of 10 per cent of a class of registered secu-
rities convertible into equity securities of the issuer. Al-
though the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has held in Chzemical Fund v. Xerox Corp. . . . that
such a class should not be considered a separate class of
equity securities for the purposes of determining liabilities
for short-swing profits under Section 16(b), the Commission
does not believe, in light of the differing purposes of Section
16(a), that that decision was determinative of the obligation
to file ownership reports. The Commission, therefore, will
continue to take the position that reports are required of
persons holding 10 per cent of a class of registered secu-
rities convertible into equity securities. 33
And in the release promulgating the amendment the Commission issued
the following caveat:
The amended rule does not purport to be determinative of
the question whether transactions in . . . convertible secu-
rities may give rise to liabilities under Section 16(b) of the
Act. The Commission regards that question as properly
32 Id.
-3 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8202 (Dec. 6, 1967), 32 Fed. Reg. 18063
(1967).
19691
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being one for the determination of the courts independently
of Rule 16a-2.14
Thus, although the Commission has not "acquiesced" in the Chemical
Fund formula, neither has it used its rulemaking power 5 to attempt
to overrule the decision as the standard for subsection (b) liability.
The net effect of the amendment appears to be as follows: all
holders of ten per cent of the outstanding convertibles are still re-
quired to file reports under section 16(a), as they presumably were
before Chemical Fund put this in doubt. What is new is that a person
who owns less than ten per cent of the convertibles, but who would
own ten per cent or more of the underlying security upon conversion
is now required to file reports under section 16(a). This is an
obligation that, prior to the amendment, would not have existed until
actual conversion. It also appears that under the amendment a person
holding securities of a class exempt from registration under section 12 36
and therefore not previously subject to section 16(a) 37-even if he
held more than ten per cent of that class-is now required to file
reports if that security is convertible into ten per cent of a registered
equity security. That person is now deemed to be the "owner" of the
registered security.
It appears the SEC was justified in its action. Admittedly, the
language of section 16 suggests that subsections (a) and (b) apply
to the same persons: subsection (a) applies to "every person who is
directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum
of any class of any equity security," and subsection (b) applies to
"such owner," thereby referring back to the definition in subsection
(a). It seems, therefore, that subsection (b) has no meaning unless
reference is made to subsection (a), and that identical coverage was
intended.3" However, the statute itself provides that the Commission
may, by rules and regulations, exempt transactions from 16(b) ; 39 the
presence of an exempting power limited to subsection (b) suggests
that, despite the verbal interdependence of the subsections, Congress
34 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8325 (June 6, 1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 8774
(1968).
35 See note 16 supra.
36 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 7 81(g) (1964).
37 Section 16(a) applies only to those 10% holders whose securities are "regis-
tered pursuant to [this Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964).
38 It might be noted that the Second Circuit in Chemical Fund evidently thought
it was supplying a rule of calculation for both subsections (a) and (b). It repeatedly
referred to its definition as relating to "section 16," rather than just section 16(b).
See, e.g., 377 F.2d at 108, 112. This apparent intention raises the question whether an
owner of 10% of the convertibles who refuses to file 16(a) reports would be liable
under § 32 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1964)) or would have a valid defense
of exemption from filing under Chemical Fund.
39 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
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contemplated the possibility of differing scopes for each. Indeed, a
more expansive application of subsection (a) than subsection (b) is
justified by several policies underlying section 16.
First, subsection (a) provides for the publication of transactions
by insiders for the purpose of deterring abusive practices.4 ° Con-
comitantly, it provides a disclosure device whereby the public can gain
valuable information about investment changes made by those likely to
be well informed about the prospects of the corporation.4" And finally,
until the law with respect to section 16(b) is accepted as settled, a
certain amount of "overkill" may be necessary under 16(a), so that
doubtful transactions will be made public and test suits can be brought.
Thus, the need for this information, especially when viewed in light of
the relatively slight burden reporting imposes upon the stockholder,
appears to justify a broader application of subsection (a).
THE APPROPRIATE "CLASS" FOR CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES
While the differing purpose of section 16(a) may justify the
expansive definition of "class" in rule 16a-2, the question remains what
is the appropriate class for 16(b) purposes. Examination of the
probable reasons for Congress's choice of "class of equity security"
as a touchstone for measuring insider status sheds light on the
propriety of the Chemical Fund definition.
Limiting section 16 to "equity securities" advances the policies of
that section for a number of reasons. While equity securities do not
necessarily have voting powers, evidently it was thought that the
voting power normally attached to equity securities (as distinct from
debt securities) provides the leverage with which an owner can either
influence the flow of public information about the corporation, and
thereby manipulate the stock prices to his advantage, or elicit advance
information from directors who depend on his votes to remain in
office. Perhaps it was thought that, even without voting power, equity
40H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934), discussing § 16(a) (then
§ 15(a) and including 5% holders) :
Because it is difficult to draw a clear line as a matter of law between truly
inside information and information generally known by the better-informed
investors, the most potent weapon against the abuse of inside information is
full and prompt publicity. For this reason, that bill requires the disclosure
of the corporate holdings of officers and directors and stockholders owning
more than 5 percent of any class of stock, and prompt disclosure of any
changes that occur in their corporate holdings.
4 1 See id.:
Under subsection (a) directors and officers of the issuer of a registered
equity security . . . and holders of more than 5 percent of any class of a
registered equity security . . . are required at the time of registration to file
with the Commission a list of their holdings of the issuer's securities and to
file monthy reports of their dealings in such securities. This is to give in-
vestors an idea of the purchases and sales by insiders which may in turn
indicate their private opinion as to the prospects of the company.
1969]
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security holders as a group are more likely to be privy to inside
information merely as a corporate gesture of goodwill than are holders
of debt securities. Another distinguishing feature of equity securities
lies in their volatility; equity securities are subject to greater price
fluctuations than are debt securities. Thus, the owner of a large
block of equity holds the threat of depressing prices by block selling,
while the bondholder generally lacks this power because of the relative
stability of the bond market. These considerations suggest that equity
securities are far more suitable for section 16 treatment, and justify the
debt-equity distinction drawn by Congress.
While the policies behind limiting section 16 to equity securities
seem relatively clear, Congress's decision to define "insider" by the
percentage ownership of a class of equity securities may seem puzzling.
Insider status could have been measured in terms of percentage owner-
ship of the dollar value of the total equity of a corporation, or the
percentage control of the aggregate voting power of all classes. Indeed,
the whole concept of percentage ownership could have been replaced
by an absolute dollar value standard, on the theory that anyone with
a given amount of money tied to one enterprise would likely be so
concerned with the company's future that a strong link, or at least the
likelihood of substantial contact, with management would be a pre-
requisite to continued investment in the corporation.
By ignoring these alternatives and adopting the class standard,
Congress opened up the possibility of seemingly anomalous results in
the imposition of 16(b) liability. Since the various classes of secu-
rities in any corporation may differ vastly in size and price, the
percentage-of-class ownership standard will reach some investors with
relatively low total equity ownership because their holdings are con-
centrated in smaller classes, while at the same time fail to include rela-
tively large total equity owners who own securities of a larger class.
This type of disparity seemed to the court in Chemical Fund a glaring
anomaly because the holder of ten per cent of convertible debentures
would hold a mere three per cent of the common were he to convert.4
There are, however, two reasons why Congress may have been
willing to tolerate this disparity. First, voting on corporate matters
often takes place by class; it is not uncommon for a state statute or
corporate charter to provide for voting on a class basis, with a majority
vote needed in each class or in some combination of classes in order
to authorize action or elect an officer.43 Thus, if a majority vote is
needed in each class, a strong position in any one class makes
4 2 See 377 F.2d at 111.
43 For examples of state statutes which require voting on a class basis, see
ILL. ANr. STAT. ch. 32, §157.54 (Smitlh-Hurd Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:5-11 (1968) ; N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 804 (McKinney 1963) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1505 (1967).
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the owner an important figure to the corporation's management. He
is a potential obstacle to management policy or to the election of
officers and directors, and thus is a likely recipient of favors and
valuable information from the power centers of the corporation.
Even aside from voting power, a sizeable percentage holding in
even a small class may confer influence and access to information. Since
each class of securities tends to have its own market, separated from
the markets of other classes by its own unique attributes and privileges,
the sale of a significant portion of any class is likely to have a consider-
able effect on the price of that class. A threat to adversely affect that
price, even when the class is relatively small, could be very significant
to management. Where the price of one type of security is low, it
becomes more expensive to raise capital by that type of security since
the amount of equity (or shares of the security) the corporation must
give each dollar it receives is higher. Also, a threat to depress the
price of any corporate security is a threat to diminish the value of any
similar securities held personally by management, regardless of the
overall size of the class of those securities. Thus, market power in
addition to voting power makes percentage ownership of any class
quite relevant to determining insider status.
If voting and market power are the elements that make "class"
relevant to the policies of section 16, it is arguable that any definition
of "class" should include only those groupings of securities which
possess the voting and market characteristics set forth above. Thus,
in determining the proper "class" for convertible securities, the initial
inquiry should be into the convertibles' voting power. However, a vot-
ing analysis is especially difficult with convertibles because their voting
powers can derive from a number of sources and vary with the par-
ticular type of security. A convertible may have an ordinary vote as
part of the class of convertibles, as in the case of a voting preferred
stock convertible into common stock. In the more common situation,
the convertible has no general voting power prior to conversion-as is
the case with most convertible debentures. Even in such a case, though,
the debenture may have potential voting power since it will usually be
convertible into some kind of voting stock. Moreover, the corporate
charter or statutes of the state of incorporation may provide for voting
rights prior to conversion in the event of a contingency such as con-
tinued nonpayment of dividends, or on questions of extraordinary
significance to the corporation." Even if such votes are not presently
exercisable, the rights upon conversion are exercisable at the will of
the convertible holder, and the preconversion rights represent a threat
of significant opposition at some important time in the future. Such
potential voting rights would most likely command significant influence
with present power-holders in the corporation. The voting-power
44 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 221, 242 (Supp. 1966).
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analysis is further muddled by the fact that preconversion voting
rights may provide for a vote as part of a separate class of convertibles,
or, instead, a vote equal to that of the stock into which they are
convertible.
The result of a voting-power analysis of the appropriate "class"
for convertible securities, then, will necessarily depend not only on
whether the convertibles are debentures or voting stock, but also on
the specific provisions of the state's corporation law and the particular
corporate charter. Where the only voting rights, present or potential,
are exercisable as and measured against votes of the underlying security,
the convertible security should be viewed as part of the class of under-
lying securities for the purpose of calculating ten per cent ownership.
However, to the extent that the voting rights are exercisable as
convertible security votes, distinct from those of the underlying security,
the convertible securities should be considered a separate "class." If
the voting rights may be exercised in both forms, it would be appro-
priate to treat the convertibles as members of both classes.
An analysis of the market power of the holder of convertible
securities leads to more definite results than does the voting-power
analysis. The extent of power conferred by the threat to sell the
convertibles must be evaluated in light of the fact that there are two
kinds of securities involved: the convertible and the underlying security.
If the price of the underlying security rises sufficiently to allow a profit
upon conversion, the underlying security exercises "sympathetic price
control" '5 over the market value of the convertible. If the stock
rises, the convertible will also rise. A sale of a large block of con-
vertibles would probably not lower the price of the convertibles for
any appreciable time. Although the initial effect of such a sale may
be to lower the convertible's price, so long as the convertible is selling
for a price lower than the total price of the underlying securities,
arbitragers will buy the convertibles,46 thus driving the price back up.
They can make an instant profit by selling the underlying security
short and then covering their sales by converting upon receipt of the
convertible security."
If the number of shares of stock sold short, however, is sufficiently
great, the effect may be to lower the price of such stocks. Whether
45 See G. LEFFLER & L. FARwELL, THE STOCK MARKET 624-25 (3d rev. ed. 1963):
Let us suppose . . . that the stock rises sufficiently to warrant a profit to
bondholders upon conversion. The conversion security is then said to exercise
"sympathetic price control" over the market value of the bond. If the stock
increases above the lowest conversion equivalent, the bond will automatically
rise because of transactions by arbitragers. These arbitragers, who see a
profit opportunity, will buy the bonds and convert into stock through an
arbitrage transaction. Conversion equivalence will be maintained as the stock
rises further.
46 Id.
47 1d. at 626.
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this occurs, of course, depends on the amount of shares of the under-
lying security that are sold, not on the total sales of the convertible.
4
1
Therefore, the market power of a holder of convertible securities is
directly related to the amount of the underlying security into which
it is convertible (so long as the underlying security is exercising
sympathetic price control). Whether the convertible holder has suffi-
cient market power to rate insider status should be determined in light
of his potential holdings of the underlying security. This is the result
reached in Chemical Fund.
On the other hand, if it would not be profitable for the convertible
holder to convert, the market value of the underlying security does not
exercise control over the price of the convertible. This is usually the
situation when a convertible is newly issued 4 or if the price of the
common has fallen below the conversion price. In such cases, the
convertible stands largely o on its own merits and, so far as market
power is concerned, is similar either to a debenture or to a preferred
stock without the conversion privilege, depending on the kind of
convertible involved. Since ordinary debentures are not treated as
equity securities under the Act,"' it would seem to follow that con-
vertible debentures in the situation posited should be similarly treated.
Furthermore, since their market would be as stable as a bond market
they should not be considered a class of equity securities divorced from
the underlying securities. Again this is the result that would be
reached by following the Chemical Fund decision. For convertible
preferred stock, however, the result should be different. The con-
vertible preferred would be like preferred without the conversion
privilege; but such securities are treated as "equity securities" under
48 A sale of convertibles representing, for example, 10% of the underlying secu-
rity would not necessarily have the same effect on the market value of the underlying
security as would a sale of 10% of the security itself. Some purchasers may have
bought in anticipation of a rise in the convertible; since they would not have sold
the underyling security short they would not have to cover by converting and could
simply sell the convertible itself to reap their gain. Others may have bought the
convertible for investment purposes; they of course would not convert and sell but
rather would hold onto the convertible.
4 9 See C. PImcaER, RAISING CAPITAL WITH CONVERTIBLE SEcuRIEs 46 (1955).
American Telegraph & Telephone has, however, issued convertibles with a conver-
sion price lower than the market quotation for the underlying common stock. Id.
It should be noted that some corporations issue convertibles with delayed con-
vertibility provisions. In other words, the debenture or preferred stock cannot be
converted until some specified date after issuance. See PimcHER, s7upra, at 50. During
the time in which the conversion privilege is suspended, the underlying security may
not exercise as much price control over the convertible, even if it would be profitable
to convert. This would be due to the fact that arbitragers would not be able to sell
short and cover their sales by converting after they bought the convertible. See
text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
50 Some people may buy the convertible in anticipation of a price rise in the
underlying security. In such cases, the convertible is not selling strictly on its merits
as a debenture or preferred stock (depending on the kind of convertible involved).
5ISee Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(11)
(1964).
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the Act " and their market would usually be the fluctuating market
of an equity security. The market-power analysis dictates that con-
vertible preferred shares be treated as a separate class when the under-
lying security is not exercising control over their price.
CONCLUSION
In light of the voting-power and market-power analyses, the result
in Chemical Fund is supportable. The convertible debentures in that
case seemed to have no voting power prior to conversion and a threat
to sell the debentures would confer market power only in relation to
the underlying common stock. This would also seem to be true for
most convertible debentures and bonds. The market power of the
debenture holder would be in proportion to the amount of securities
into which the debenture is convertible. Moreover, it would seem to
be the exception rather than the rule for a convertible debenture to
have voting power, actual or potential, exercisable in terms of the class
of convertibles. It must be noted, however, that the convertible
debenture is simply a contract; 53 it is possible for the corporation to
create a class of convertible debentures that would possess significant
voting power."' In such a case, the Chemical Fund rule of treating
only the underlying securities as the "class" should not be followed. 5
Rather, the holder of convertibles should be treated as a member of both
the convertible class and the underlying class in the manner of
rule 16a-2."
Convertible preferred stock, however, may not fit into the
Chemical Fund mould. Preferred stock is much more likely to have
52 d.; See Ellerin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir.
1959).
53 See A. BERiE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CoaroRATE FrANCE 132-34 (1928).
54 If there is any provision for the convertibles to vote as a class--even if such
voting is contingent on some future event-it would appear appropriate to treat the
convertibles as a separate class.
5 It would, of course, be desirable to have a rule for determining the appropriate
class that does not vary with the attributes of the particular security. It is tempting
to say that, as long as there is a possibility that some converible debentures will possess
attributes that make them appropriate for treatment as a separate class, then all con-
vertible debentures should be treated as separate classes. Section 16 was meant to
be a "crude rule of thumb," wasn't it?
Such reasoning is specious. The "crudeness" of § 16 is the irrebuttable presump-
tion that those subject to the section are trading on inside information if they buy
and sell securities of the corporation within a 6 month period. Because of the harsh-
ness of this presumption, it might be more appropriate to be particularly wary of
including "innocent" people within its operation. If there were a statutory presump-
tion, for example, that anyone found on premises where marijuana was being smoked
would be conclusively presumed to have been smoking marijuana, one might be
hesitant to say that someone found in the backyard or sidewalk was on the "premises."
An insider-by-insider approach has been adopted in the analogous area of who is
an officer of a corporation for § 16 purposes, see note 16 supra. The disadvantages
of such a case by case approach would seem to be outweighed by the advantages of
a more flexible and equitable rule.
56 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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voting power prior to conversion than would convertible debentures.
In fact, preferred stock without the conversion privilege is treated as
a "class of equity securities" under the Act; it may have been so
treated for the very reason that preferred is likely to possess significant
voting power. The market-power analysis also leads to the conclusion
that convertible preferred should be treated as a separate class.
If the convertible is newly issued, it is unlikely that the underlying
security will have a significant impact on its price.5 7  Since the pre-
ferred market may be fairly volatile, as compared with the stable bond
market, a sale of a significant amount of preferred at that time could
markedly depress the market for convertible preferred. This, of course,
would not be so if the underlying security was exerting price control
over the preferred. But to have a rule that would treat the preferred
as a separate class only when the total price of the underlying securities
makes it unprofitable to convert would be unworkable. Day to day
price fluctuations would affect the status of the holder. This fact,
coupled with the concern of Congress for holders of preferred even
without the conversion privilege, leads to the conclusion that the "class
of equity securities" should be both the convertible preferred and the
underlying stock-the same result reached under the Commission's
rule 16a-2.
5
7 See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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